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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 04-2269
___________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
RENARD BROWN,
a/k/a
NARD,
Appellant
________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
District Court Judge: The Honorable Stewart Dalzell
(Criminal No. 02-00172-21)
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 2, 2006
BEFORE: SLOVITER and FUENTES, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,* Chief
International Trade Judge.
(March 15, 2006 )
_______________________

*

Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief International Trade Judge, sitting by
designation.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________________

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Renard Brown appeals from his conviction at trial for conspiracy to distribute
cocaine and cocaine base, possession of cocaine base, and possession of cocaine base
within 1000 feet of a school. Brown also appeals his sentence of 300 months in prison.
Regarding his conviction, Brown argues that the District Court erred in denying his
motion to sever, as well as in its instructions to the jury regarding the concept of a “buyerseller relationship.” Brown also argues that the District Court should have granted his
motion for acquittal on the conspiracy charge because the government did not present
evidence sufficient for a conviction. As to his sentence, Brown argues that his case should
be remanded for resentencing in accordance with the Supreme Court’s opinion in United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). We reject Brown’s appeal of his conviction but
remand for resentencing in accordance with Booker.
BACKGROUND
I.

Because we write only for the parties, our summary of the facts is abbreviated. In
October 2002, Brown was indicted along with thirty-six co-defendants for conspiracy to
distribute cocaine and cocaine base. Brown was also charged with possession of cocaine
base and possession of cocaine base within 1000 feet of a school. Due to the large number
of defendants requesting trial, the District Court ordered the government to propose
2

groupings of five or fewer defendants for several smaller trials. The government sent a
letter to the court and all counsel proposing that the first trial consist of Brown and four
co-defendants. No defendants objected to this proposal by the appointed deadline, and the
District Court adopted it. When Brown later filed a motion for severance, the District
Court denied it as moot, and also found that Brown would not be prejudiced by the
proposed joint trial. Brown was tried in January 2004 and was convicted on all counts.
At sentencing, the District Court applied an enhancement under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines based on a finding that Brown had been involved in a homicide,
but included a downward departure because Brown’s role was not as significant as that of
other co-conspirators. The District Court calculated a guideline range of 292-365 months
and sentenced Brown to 300 months in prison.
DISCUSSION

I.
Brown argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion for severance. He
claims that spillover evidence related to his co-defendants was prejudicial to his case at
trial, and that he was therefore deprived of a fair trial.1 This Court reviews the denial of a
pre-trial motion to sever for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 369
(3d Cir. 2001). Even if a district court abuses its discretion in denying a motion to sever,

1

The District Court had jurisdiction over this federal criminal case pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has jurisdiction over Brown’s appeal of his conviction and
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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the defendant must show “‘clear and substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair
trial’” to obtain a reversal. United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 655 (3d Cir. 1993)
(quoting United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal citation and
emphasis omitted)).
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b), two or more defendants may be
charged in the same indictment if “they are alleged to have participated in the same act or
transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or
offenses.” Generally, there is “a preference in the federal system for joint trials of
defendants who are indicted together.” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993).
A district court may sever defendants for trial, however, if consolidation “appears to
prejudice a defendant.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a).
Here, Brown does not discuss whether the District Court abused its discretion, but
focuses instead on the issue of prejudice. He argues that a significant portion of his trial
dealt with his co-defendants’ relationship with Courtney Carter and James Patterson, two
central figures in the conspiracy. He also states that the government emphasized Brown’s
co-defendants’ lavish lifestyle at trial, suggesting that it was supported by drug sales, but
presented no evidence that he had a similar lifestyle. In addition, he claims that there was
extensive evidence presented at trial of shootings, weapons possession, and drug sales
that were not tied to Brown. Brown claims that all of this evidence unrelated to his
conduct inappropriately led to his conviction.
According to the government, Brown and his four co-defendants were joined for
4

trial because they all sold drugs at the same critical drug distribution location and shared
the same individual as their source for drugs. The government also contends that these
five defendants were involved in nearly all of the acts of violence committed by the
conspiracy. Based on this connection between the defendants, the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s pre-trial motion for severance. Cf. United States
v. Gorecki, 813 F.2d 40, 42 (3d Cir. 1987) (suggesting that charges may be joined at trial
where they are “sufficiently connected logically or temporally”).
Regardless, Brown has not established prejudice. The fact that not all of the
government’s evidence at trial was directly tied to Brown does not in itself imply
prejudice. See United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 568 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Prejudice
should not be found in a joint trial just because all evidence adduced is not germane to all
counts against each defendant.”). In addition, because the defendants were charged with
conspiracy, acts committed by one in furtherance of the conspiracy were relevant and
admissible against another. Hart, 273 F.3d at 370. Moreover, the government did present
evidence tying Brown to the actions of his co-defendants, including a homicide, and also
presented evidence that he was the co-lessee of an apartment where weapons and
ammunition were kept. Thus, Brown’s claim based on the District Court’s denial of his
motion to sever must fail.2

2

Brown’s claim that the jury failed to distinguish between the different defendants
and various pieces of evidence at trial is also weakened by the fact that two of Brown’s
co-defendants at trial were acquitted of certain charges.
5

II.
Brown also contends that the District Court did not properly instruct the jury about
the possibility that a “buyer-seller relationship,” rather than a conspiracy, existed between
Brown and his co-defendants. There is no evidence that Brown objected on this basis at
trial, and we therefore review the instructions for plain error. United States v. Guadalupe,
402 F.3d 409, 410 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005). Under that standard, “‘before an appellate court can
correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that
affect[s] substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then
exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” United
States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 99 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520
U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997)).
Brown asserts that his central defense at trial was that he was not part of a
conspiracy with his co-defendants, but that instead he had only a buyer-seller relationship
with them. Under the precedent of this Circuit, “a simple buyer-seller relationship,
without any prior or contemporaneous understanding beyond the sales agreement itself, is
insufficient to establish that the buyer was a member of the seller’s conspiracy.” United
States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Brown argues that he was entitled to a
detailed instruction on this principle.
In its instructions to the jury, the District Court stated:
With respect to evidence regarding buyer-seller relationship, the existence
6

of such a relationship is not by itself proof that one is a conspirator in a drug
conspiracy, but such a relationship may be considered in conjunction with
other evidence to prove that one is indeed such a conspirator.
Brown does not contend that this instruction was inaccurate, but suggests that the District
Court should have provided more detail. This claim is meritless. In addition to the above
instruction, the District Court also properly described the knowledge requirement in a
conspiracy charge. The Court told the jury that to obtain a guilty verdict as to conspiracy,
the government must prove both “the conspiracy, agreement or understanding to
distribute mixtures or substances containing detectable amounts of cocaine or cocaine
base” and that “the defendant knew the purpose of the agreement and deliberately joined
it with the intent to further its unlawful purpose.” The District Court also gave the
following instruction:
Now, merely associating with others and discussing common goals, mere
similarity of conduct between or among such persons or knowing about
criminal conduct, do not make someone a member of the conspiracy.
Similarly, just because a defendant may have done something that happened
to help a conspiracy, does not necessarily make him a conspirator.
Thus, the District Court properly instructed the jury that a guilty verdict would require a
finding that Brown understood the purpose of the conspiracy and decided to join it, and
that other associations, including a buyer-seller relationship, would not in themselves
support a finding of guilt. No further instruction on this point was necessary. Brown has
not established plain error, and we deny his appeal on this ground.
III.
Next, Brown appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion for acquittal under
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Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Brown argues that there was
insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty of the conspiracy charge, and that at
best, the government only established a buyer-seller relationship between Brown and
certain of his co-defendants. In considering a challenge based on sufficiency of the
evidence for conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government and “will sustain the verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Dent, 149
F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, a
“claim of insufficiency of the evidence places a very heavy burden on an appellant.”
United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1132 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
Under this strict standard, Brown’s claim must fail. The government’s evidence
against Brown at trial included, among other things, testimony describing Brown
transferring money regularly to a co-conspirator (SA 93-95); testimony identifying Brown
as one of the “workers” on a block where the conspiracy operated (SA 865-68, 877);
testimony stating that Brown was supervised by and worked directly for individuals in
more senior positions in the conspiracy (SA 456-57, 615-17); testimony suggesting that
Brown was involved in a homicide related to the conspiracy (SA 484, 487, 494-95); and
testimony indicating that Brown was one of several conspirators who attempted to aid
another conspirator in escaping from the police (SA 345). A rational trier of fact could
have found that Brown was a member of the conspiracy alleged by the government based
on this evidence. We therefore deny Brown’s appeal of his conviction on this basis.
8

IV.
Lastly, Brown appeals his sentence based on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Booker. The District Court sentenced Brown prior to the Booker holding, and increased
Brown’s sentence based on judicial findings of fact under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. We therefore remand for resentencing in accordance with Booker. See United
States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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